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In searching for the roots of human language, comparative researchers investigate
whether precursors to language are already present in our closest relatives, the non-
human primates. As the majority of studies into primates’ communication use a
unimodal approach with focus on one signal type only, researchers investigate very
different aspects depending on whether they are interested in vocal, gestural, or facial
communication. Here, we focus on two signal types and discuss how meaning is
created in the gestural (visual, tactile/auditory) as compared to the vocal modality in non-
human primates, to highlight the different research foci across these modalities. First,
we briefly describe the defining features of meaning in human language and introduce
some debates concerning meaning in non-human communication. Second, with focus
on these features, we summarize the current evidence for meaningful communication
in gestural as compared to vocal communication and demonstrate that meaning is
operationalized very differently by researchers in these two fields. As a result, it is
currently not possible to generalize findings across these modalities. Rather than arguing
for or against the occurrence of semantic communication in non-human primates, we
aim at pointing to gaps of knowledge in studying meaning in our closest relatives, and
these gaps might be closed.
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INTRODUCTION
Human language is characterized by a number of ‘design features’ (Hockett, 1960). Semanticity,
with signals linked to specific meanings, is closely related to other design features. For example,
arbitrariness refers to the lack of a natural connection between the signal’s signifying form and its
signified meaning – the concept to which it refers (de Saussure, 2003/1916). Duality of patterning
represents the ability to combine a limited set of meaningless components (phonemes) into
meaningful structures (morphemes, words) and even longer, more complex sequences (sentences),
organized based on specific rules (syntax), while productivity refers to the capacity to produce an
infinite number of expressions. Since the purpose of such signals is communication, intentional use
(specialization) is another key feature of language (Hockett, 1960). Although there are various other
features characterizing human language, we will focus on this selection, as these features are closely
linked to meaning in human language. They are therefore central to our comparative approach to
meaning in primate communication.
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As comparative researchers assume a gradual evolution
of human language, they suggest that precursors to these
characterizing features of language are already present in our
closest relatives, the non-human primates (hereafter: primates).
Consequently, research into their communicative abilities has
been shaped by terms and concepts used to characterize
human language. It has, however, been questioned whether
the use of linguistic terms is justified when describing the
communicative abilities of primates (Scott-Phillips, 2008). For
example, regarding meaning, Rendall et al. (2009) argue
that animal signals merely influence others, but they cannot
convey semantic information (but see Scarantino, 2010). While
in human language, meaning “. . .is the central explanatory
construct . . .[which] arises from the common representational
states of speakers and listeners” (Rendall et al., 2009, p. 234),
in primates, signalers neither intend to inform others when
communicating nor do they consider whether recipients need
this information (but see Crockford et al., 2012). Meaningful
communication, however, involves “overt intentionality”, which
requires the sender to “. . .produce signals with an intention that
receivers recognise that the signaller has such intention” (Scott-
Phillips, 2016, p. 233). This intentional structure is suggested
to be an inherent component of meaningful communication
(Grice, 1957), fueling the debate whether such ostensive
communication – with the signalers’ communicative intention
accompanied by their intention to inform – is unique to humans
(Scott-Phillips, 2015b) or shared with other primates (Moore,
2016).
Here, we will not argue in favor of or against claims for
meaningful communication in other primates. Rather, our aim
is to demonstrate that in research on primate communication,
meaning is conceptualized very differently depending on the
signal type studied. We will contrast research into gestural
communication – including visual, but also tactile and auditory
gestures – and vocalizations of primates with regard to those
features relevant for meaning: the roles of the sender and
the recipient for identifying meaning, the relationship between
the signal and its reference (arbitrariness), intentional use
(specialization), and the combination of different signals into
meaningful sequences (duality of patterning, productivity). Note
that as some of these features are closely related or might
partly overlap, it is not always possible to address each of them
separately.
Primates communicate via different sensory channels,
including olfactory, tactile, visual and auditory signals. However,
signals are often not differentiated based on their sensory
modality, but are rather categorized based on the different
cognitive mechanisms assumed to underlie their usage (Liebal
et al., 2013b). Consequently, researchers distinguish gestures,
facial expressions, and vocalizations. Here, we focus on
gestures and vocalizations only, as there are virtually no studies
on meaningful combinations or intentional usage of facial
expressions (for exceptions, see Waller et al., 2015; Scheider et al.,
2016).
Gestures are movements of the limbs or head (e.g., ‘extend
arm’, ‘head shake’) or body postures (e.g., ‘present’). As they can
comprise different sensory modalities, visual gestures (e.g., ‘wrist
offer’) are differentiated from tactile (e.g., ‘slap’) and auditory
gestures (e.g., ‘chest beat’), with the latter producing a sound,
which does not engage the vocal folds (Call and Tomasello, 2007).
Vocalizations (or calls), however, emerge from the larynx, unlike
sounds (e.g., ‘raspberries’, ‘whistles’), which do not engage the
focal folds.
RELATIONSHIP(S) BETWEEN
SIGNALS AND THEIR REFERENTS
(ARBITRARINESS)
Whether signals have meaning(s) is closely linked to whether
they refer to specific referents. In human communication, the
exact nature of the relationship(s) between a signal and its
referent may vary, as reference is differently conceptualized
across disciplines and modalities (Leavens et al., 2005). While
linguists use “reference” synonymously with symbolic reference
to indicate that in spoken language, “a word stands for
something”, developmental psychologists also consider non-
verbal means of communication in the form of referential
gestures, such as pointing gestures of pre-linguistic children
(Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2005), which can be used
to refer to different referents. Furthermore, while linguists
highlight the arbitrary relationship between a word and
its referent, developmental psychologists suggest that for
pointing gestures, the triadic relationship between signaler,
recipient, and the external entity is not arbitrary, as “. . .a
point’s specific meaning is determined in large part by the
spatial locations of the pointer, the thing indicated, and the
communicative partner” (Leavens et al., 2005, p. 185). Together
this shows that in human communication, reference is treated
differently in spoken language compared to visual non-verbal
communication.
Likewise, for primates, comparative researchers operationalize
reference differently depending on signal type. Vocal researchers
focus on context-specific vocalizations to find “. . .the animal
equivalent to referential words in human language” (Liebal
et al., 2013b, p. 399), in the form of functionally referential
vocalizations. They are produced in response to a specific
stimulus (the referent, e.g., a predator), with receivers showing
a specific response to these calls, even in the absence of
the eliciting stimulus, indicating that this response itself is
stimulus-independent (Macedonia and Evans, 1993; Evans,
1997). As it is unclear whether primates’ calls refer to
a specific referent, for example, a predator (“leopard”), or
are requesting a specific action in response to this referent
(“go up tree”), the term “functional” is used for primates’
referential vocalizations to distinguish them from human
referential communication. The ground-breaking finding that
vervet monkeys use distinct predator-specific alarm calls
in encounters with their main predators (eagles, leopards,
pythons) sparked great interest in such functionally referential
vocalizations, as playback experiments confirmed that the
monkeys showed predator-specific responses upon hearing the
corresponding alarm call (Seyfarth et al., 1980). Although
claims suggesting the “word-like” nature of these alarm calls
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have not been confirmed, many following studies found
evidence for functionally referential vocalizations in many
primate species. They vary in their degree of specificity as
they may refer to specific (e.g., leopard versus eagle) or types
of predators (e.g., aerial or terrestrial) (Schel et al., 2009),
and have been found in different contexts, such as predation,
feeding, or social behavior (Di Bitetti, 2003; Slocombe et al.,
2010).
In the gestural modality, visual signals in the form of
pointing gestures have received considerable attention regarding
their referential function. In humans, pointing gestures emerge
early in ontogeny (Liszkowski et al., 2004), and are used to
refer to different external entities, such as objects, persons, or
events. Thus, pointing gestures have no one-to-one referential
meaning; instead, the meaning of a pointing gesture depends
on its context of use and the common ground shared
by the gesturer and the recipient (Liebal et al., 2013a).
In primates, the use of pointing gestures has mostly been
studied in interactions with humans (Call and Tomasello,
1994; Leavens et al., 1996; but see Vea and Sabater-Pi,
1998; Hobaiter et al., 2014), within which they use these
gestures to request food rewards or objects they cannot
obtain otherwise (Bullinger et al., 2011). Like in humans,
the meaning of primates’ points depends on the context
and the common ground primates share with the human
experimenter (Bohn et al., 2016). Iconic gestures represent
another type of referential gestures, which depict specific objects
or actions, resulting in a non-arbitrary relationship between the
gesture and the referent. Although concepts of iconicity differ
across studies (Perlman et al., 2014), there is some evidence
that primates use iconic gestures, mostly to request specific
actions (Tanner and Byrne, 1996; Douglas and Moscovice,
2015).
Together this shows that the nature of relationships between
a signal and its referent(s) varies across modalities: while some
vocalizations are functionally referential signals that refer to
specific referents, the relationship between a gesture and its
referent(s) varies across gesture types. Pointing gestures can be
used to refer to different entities, while iconic gestures depict
specific actions.
INTENDED VERSUS EXTRACTED
MEANING: THE ROLES OF SIGNALERS
AND RECIPIENTS (SEMANTICITY AND
SPECIALIZATION)
Inspired by ethology, some scholars suggest differentiating
between the “messages” of the signaler and the “meaning”
extracted by the receiver (Smith, 1965; Font and Carazo, 2010).
Meaning is thus conceptualized very differently depending
on whether the focus is on the signaler’s or recipient’s
behavior. Vocal studies traditionally focus on the recipient.
By using playback studies, researchers investigate recipients’
responses toward specific vocalizations to extract their meaning,
while they consider contextual information or the signaler’s
behavior to a much lesser extent than gesture studies. In the
gestural domain, it is not possible to use similar playback
experiments to elicit responses to specific gestures at least in
interactions between conspecifics. Therefore, unlike in vocal
communication, gesture researchers focus on the signaler and
investigate whether they produce their gestures intentionally.
The term “intentional” is applied in a sense that an individual
communicates in a purposeful, goal-directed way, by means of
voluntarily controlled actions, while this does not necessarily
imply that the recipient understands a signaler’s gesture as an
intended act of communication. It is also debated whether
apes who gesture intentionally could additionally be said
to act with communicative intentions (Scott-Phillips, 2015a;
Moore, 2016; Townsend et al., 2017). Furthermore, unlike
in vocal studies, gesture research largely ignores context-
specific signals, as flexible usage is an important criterion
to identify intentional communication. Therefore, researchers
focus on those gestures used across different contexts and
argue that the meaning of a gesture might differ depending
on the context in which it is used (Call and Tomasello,
2007). However, although contextual information contributes
to identifying a gesture’s meaning, “context” should not be
used as a substitute for “meaning”. More recently, gesture
researchers have started to also consider recipients’ responses
to identify the signalers’ intended meaning when performing
a gesture (more in section “New Developments and the Way
Forward in Studying Meaning in Primate Communication”),
which is more in keeping with vocal research. Importantly, note
that “intentional gesture production” has to be distinguished
from the “signaler’s intended meaning”: A message is only
taken to have an intended meaning (as distinct from an
intended effect) if it was produced not only intentionally,
but with communicative intent – that is, if it was produced
both intentionally and ostensively (Scott-Phillips, 2015a; Moore,
2016).
Unlike in the gestural modality, intentionality in vocal
production has received little attention. Vocalizations have
been suggested to be involuntary expressions of emotional
states (Tomasello, 2008), supported by neurobiological
studies indicating that vocal production is largely mediated
by several motor nuclei in the pons and the reticular
formation in the medulla, with no direct connections to
cortical motor areas (Jürgens, 2002). This traditional notion,
however, is increasingly being challenged, as it has been
shown that several cortical areas (e.g., anterior cingulate
gyrus and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) are involved in
the production of volitional calls (Gavrilov et al., 2017).
Furthermore, as vocal researchers have started to consider
the signaler’s behavior, they found that chimpanzees’ alarm
calls are most likely intentionally produced signals (Schel
et al., 2013). Chimpanzees even seem to consider conspecifics’
knowledge states, as they only vocalize when unknowledgeable
individuals are close to a hidden predator (Crockford et al.,
2012).
Thus, to determine a signal’s meaning, gesture researchers
usually focus on the signaler’s behavior, while vocal researchers
consider the recipient’s reactions. However, research on both
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modalities is increasingly investigating both signalers’ and
recipients’ behaviors to extract the meaning of vocal and gestural
signals.
CREATION OF NEW MEANINGS
(DUALITY OF PATTERNING,
PRODUCTIVITY, SYNTAX)
Duality of patterning and productivity are two design features of
human language, which both relate to creating new meaningful
utterances from an existing, potentially limited repertoire.
Comparative researchers are therefore interested in whether
primates also combine their signals into meaningful sequences.
They investigate whether combinations of several signals are
used for different functions than the components they consist
of, or alternatively, whether the meaning of one of the
components is modified by the other component. Combining
several signals is closely linked to the question of whether a
specific order is crucial for the creation of new meaning and
thus whether such combinations are based on specific syntactical
rules.
Zuberbühler (2002) demonstrated that in some situations,
Campbell’s monkeys combine their alarm calls with a preceding
boom-call, which modifies the meaning of the following alarm
call. Thus, while the functionally referential alarm call is uttered
in encounters with their predators, they use this specific call
combination in less dangerous situations, such as falling trees.
Proceeding from this finding, later studies concluded that “. . .the
Campbell’s monkey call system may be the most complex
example of ‘proto-syntax’ in animal communication known to
date” (Ouattara et al., 2009). A different system was found
in Putty-nosed monkeys that use two alarm calls, which are
not predator-specific. Interestingly, the reference to specific
predators is achieved by producing sequences of calls, as hack-
sequences are more likely to be used in response to eagles,
while pyow-sequences occur in response to leopards (Arnold
and Zuberbühler, 2006). Combinations of the two call types,
however, are used to initiate group travels, indicating that
by combining these different vocalizations, new meaning is
created.
In the gestural domain, sequences are defined as multiple
gestures produced one after the other by one individual, toward
the same recipient and the same goal, with sequences varying in
the number of gestures combined (Liebal et al., 2004). Although
findings across species and studies differ, common conclusion are
that gestures are not combined in ways to create new meanings
and that gesture combinations are not governed by specific rules
(e.g., Genty and Byrne, 2010; Roberts et al., 2013; Hobaiter et al.,
2014).
This suggests that gesture combinations are not based on
combinatorial rules and are not used for different functions
than their single components like it has been shown for
vocalizations. However, the finding that primates are able to
combine vocalizations into more complex sequences with specific
meanings is also debated, as “. . .there is no evidence of the
compositionality essential to language—having a few sequences
TABLE 1 | Different approaches to studying meaning in primates’ gestural and
vocal communication.
Gestures Vocalizations
Who is studied? Signaler (and recipient) Recipient
Is intentionality considered? Yes (production) No
How is meaning studied? Intended meaning Extracted meaning
Which signals are studied? Context-unspecific Context-specific
What is the relationship











Which species are studied? Apes Monkeys
Which methods are used? Observations Playback experiments
Where are studies conducted? Captivity Natural habitats
with a well-defined meaning does not qualify as syntax” (Arbib
et al., 2008).
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND THE WAY
FORWARD IN STUDYING MEANING IN
PRIMATE COMMUNICATION
We have shown that meaning in primates is conceptualized
and studied very differently in the gestural as compared
to the vocal modality (Table 1). Rather than representing
fundamental differences across modalities, this may reflect
different research traditions and historical limitations in
methodological approaches. While gesture research focuses on
signalers and whether they communicate intentionally, vocal
researchers study the recipients’ responses to identify the
meaning they extract from a call. Gesture researchers highlight
the importance of the context in which an interaction takes
place, as it contributes to a gesture’s meaning. They focus on
flexible gesture usage as an important characteristic of intentional
communication, and are less interested in context-specific
gestures. Vocal researchers, however, traditionally focus on
context-specific, functionally referential vocalizations. Slocombe
et al. (2011) further demonstrated that gestures are usually
studied in great apes, in captive settings, by using observational
methods, while most research on vocalizations is conducted with
monkey species, in their natural habitats, by using experimental
methods. These fundamental differences in how meaning is
studied across modalities hinder comparisons across signal types
and make it difficult to conclude whether there is evidence for
meaningful communication in primates. Furthermore, it seems
that researchers are often not aware that they use the term
meaning very differently, which in turn does not support a fruitful
discourse about how comparative approaches contribute to our
understanding of language evolution (Bar-On and Moore, 2017).
However, in both vocal and gestural research, traditional
approaches have been questioned and new approaches for
studying meaning have been suggested. For example, in
the vocal modality, the concept of functionally referential
vocalizations has been recently criticized for a number of
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different reasons (see Wheeler and Fischer, 2012; Fischer and
Price, 2016). First, because of the strong focus on context-specific
vocalizations, the prevalence and significance of functionally
referential vocalizations might have been overestimated as
compared to other, less context-specific vocalizations. Second,
it is often assumed that these vocalizations might require more
sophisticated cognitive skills than other vocalizations or other
signal types, since the differentiated responses of receivers of
such calls “. . .have been widely interpreted as evidence that
signals elicit mental representations in receivers based on the
information extracted from the signal” (Wheeler and Fischer,
2012, p. 199). However, such specific responses may be explained
by lower-level mechanisms such as classical conditioning,
“. . .without drawing on the concept of information, the
meaning of calls, or mental representations of a signal’s
purported referent in listeners” (Wheeler and Fischer, 2012,
p. 199). Because of this, the relationship between a vocal
signal and its referent might not be as arbitrary as previously
suggested. Wheeler and Fischer (2012) therefore suggested
abandoning the concept of functionally referential vocalizations.
Rather, meaning in primate vocal communication should be
studied in the framework of pragmatics to investigate how
primates use contextual information – in addition to the
information provided by the signal itself (Wheeler and Fischer,
2012).
In the gestural domain, we can observe the opposite trend.
While gesture researchers have previously proposed that gestures
do not have inherent meaning, but have rather highlighted
the importance of the context for defining the meaning of a
gesture (Call and Tomasello, 2007), recent studies emphasize
that gestures indeed have specific meaning (Cartmill and Byrne,
2010; Hobaiter and Byrne, 2014; Graham et al., 2018). This
new approach focuses on both the signaler and the recipient by
investigating if the signaler’s intended meaning when using a
gesture matches with a particular outcome (Byrne et al., 2017).
If the recipient’s response satisfied the signaler – evident in
the signaler stopping the production of a certain gesture – this
is referred to as the “apparently satisfactory outcome” of this
specific gesture. In other words, the matching of the intended
and extracted meaning is used as an approximation of the
gesture’s meaning. Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) found that wild
chimpanzees use at least some gestures with tight meaning, in
a sense that the same outcome was observed in more than
70% of their use, while other gestures have loose meaning, as
they elicited the same outcome in only 50–70%. Note, however,
that chimpanzees still used the majority of their gestures for
multiple outcomes (Hobaiter and Byrne, 2014), as found by
other studies, which focused on the flexibility of gesture use,
and which therefore concluded that chimpanzee gestures have
no inherent meaning, as the meaning is defined by the context
in which they are used (Tomasello et al., 1994). This shows that
conclusions drawn from such studies depend at least partly on
which findings are emphasized: while some authors focus on
those gestures flexibly used across different contexts and conclude
that gestures have no meaning, others focus on context-specific
gestures, used for one or few outcomes, and consequently
emphasize their specific meaning(s). Future research should
bring together these two perspectives and study context-specific
and unspecific gestures in concert, as gesture types may vary in
their degree of specificity, as found for vocalizations. For example,
chimpanzees’ visual gestures are more likely to occur in a specific
context (e.g., sexual behavior, requesting food) and thus represent
“intention movements”, which are abbreviations of full-fledged
behaviors used for a specific purpose (Tomasello et al., 1989),
while tactile and auditory gestures are often produced across
different contexts to trigger others’ actions (Liebal and Call,
2012).
Related to this, it is important to discuss how specific meaning
has to be, particularly if we aim at comparing meaning across
modalities (Scarantino, 2013). Thus, we have shown that pointing
gestures have no one-to-one referential meaning, as pointing can
be used to refer to different entities, while functionally referential
vocalizations often refer to specific referents. Furthermore,
researchers differentiate between tight and loose meanings of
chimpanzee gestures, and even gestures with tight meanings
may result in multiple outcomes. This highlights the lack of
definitions applicable across modalities as well as a lack of a
measure based on which the specificity of meaning of a signal can
be judged.
Sievers and Gruber (2016) therefore suggest using a
“pragmatic notion of reference” that focuses on the use of a
signal to refer to something in a specific situation – rather than
expecting that signals have referential meaning in themselves.
They further highlight that in human language, reference is
an action of the signaler and claim that “. . .any definition
describing reference in non-human animals must also focus
on the producer” (Sievers and Gruber, 2016, p. 759). In other
words, a signal only has referential meaning if the signaler
intends to refer to a specific referent. This has important
implications, as functionally referential vocalizations have been
almost exclusively studied with focus on the recipient. Therefore,
to be able to conclude that vocalizations are indeed meaningful,
we would have to additionally demonstrate that they are
intentionally produced.
Finally, we have argued that unlike in the vocal modality,
there is currently no evidence for meaningful combinations in
gesture sequences. This may be partly explained by the fact
that there is only little research investigating if single gestures
are meaningful units. As a result, we are currently lacking
sufficient datasets to determine whether a gesture’s meaning
changes when it is part of a sequence compared to when it
is used in isolation. Furthermore, we want to highlight the
importance of multimodal approaches (Slocombe et al., 2010),
as it is currently unclear whether combinations consisting of
different signal types, such as gesture plus facial expression
or gesture plus vocalization result in the creation of new
meaning or the modification of an existing one (Hobaiter et al.,
2017; Wilke et al., 2017). To study meaningful communication
in primates in more comprehensive ways, the essential first
step is to combine research efforts across modalities, based
on shared definitions which are applicable across signal types
and to use a multi-perspective approach, which considers the
behavior of both signalers and recipients, in addition to the
context.
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